

## || CHAPTER FIVE

# HOW THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER BROUGHT THE CUBAN CIVIL WAR TO LAKE TANGANYIKA

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DR. GOTTLIEB's lethal virus, and the rest of Dr. Gottlieb's poison sampler, stayed locked in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" in Larry Devlin's office safe. In testimony before the Church Committee, Devlin and Dr. Gottlieb said that the poisons were eventually dumped into the Congo River. But each testified that he alone did this dumping, not the other. Dr. Gottlieb said he disposed of the poisons before leaving Zaire on October 5, 1960, and Devlin said he disposed of them many months later. Devlin allowed that he may well have held onto them until Lumumba was safely dispatched by other means. One only hopes that what was finally dumped was harmless after being diluted by the world's sixth-longest river, but the Church Committee report offers no assurance of that.

The U.S. role in the overthrow and murder of Patrice Lumumba stayed locked in the CIA's cellar of secrets for a full fifteen years, until the Church Committee negotiated its brief opening of the cellar door in 1975. Yet in all that time, while the cellar door stayed shut for the American people, there were few high school students in Africa who didn't "know" the Lumumba secret, at least to their satisfaction. As little else could have, Lumumba's death made the United States suspect to Africans. Lumumba attained true martyrdom. And the martyrdom wasn't just among leftist movements, which understandably played his death for all it was worth. Rather, in nations up and down the continent, even in basically capitalist countries like Nigeria and Kenya—most ironically, even in Zaire itself—one still finds Patrice Lumumba's name affixed to avenues, squares, parks, and schools.

Lumumba has become Africa's most widely recognized hero. People in cities and villages across Zaire say they look to Lumumba's sons to come back and govern their country someday. Most don't know how many sons he had, or where they are. In fact, an accurate count is hard to come by, although several sons have been reported living in Europe and North Africa. But for Zairians, they exist more as legend than fact.

Socialists, of course, claim Lumumba died for socialism. But there is little reason to believe he knew much about socialism. In fact, all through his brief career as a leader he had publicly pledged to respect private property and even foreign investment. He probably didn't know much about private property, either—no Congolese had much—so he may well have pledged to protect it only at Western urging. But it showed he was at least open-minded.

Lumumba had not even leveled claims against the foreign cartels that were toting away his country's minerals with scant compensation. One could fairly assume he would have insisted on changing the mineral deal after the situation had settled down. But that is hardly socialism. The main cartel operating at the time, the Union Minière unit of Société Générale, was hardly a free enterprise, either—it was effectively an arm of the Belgian crown.

Lumumba might, of course, have created a Zairian government agency to take over the mineral business. This is what Mobutu did when he created Gecamines and Sozacom. This is socialism, although the U.S., having installed Mobutu to prevent such a thing, can't call it that. But if Lumumba would have differed from Mobutu on the issue of government ownership versus independent private ownership, it could only have been in the direction of more private ownership.

Nor did Lumumba ever threaten the multiparty political system, which Mobutu eventually outlawed. Maybe Lumumba would have outlawed it, too, but if he would have differed from Mobutu on this issue it could only have been in the direction of more political freedom.

Lumumba is a hero to Africans not because he promoted socialism, which he didn't, but because he resisted foreign intervention. He stood up to outsiders, if only by getting himself killed. Most Africans who think about such things at all would say that the principal outsider he stood up to was the United States. The facts seem to bear them out.

Lumumba may well have been a luckless victim of the U.S.'s growing frustration with Cuba. The U.S. government was determined never again to be fooled and betrayed by a Soviet ally posing as a nationalist, which is the way it perceived Fidel Castro. (After all, how could the United States ever not get its way, except that it was betrayed?) So one experience was overlaid on another, an ocean away, with typical inappropriateness.

Whatever one wants to guess about the secret intentions Castro harbored when he took over Cuba, and about whether Castro was ever open to dissuasion from at least initially adopting a socialist course, it is hard to argue

that *Lumumba* had a prior ideological commitment. In their backgrounds, in the course of their rise to leadership, in their alliances, in their grip on the loyalties of their own peoples, the two men weren't comparable, despite the relentless determination of Allen Dulles and other U.S. policymakers to compare them.

Castro was an intellectual and a lawyer who spent a decade organizing and leading a successful popular revolution. Lumumba came relatively out of the woodwork.

Lumumba's association with socialism was largely involuntary and posthumous, the result of U.S. policy. Yet because of Lumumba's martyrdom, his association with socialism has become a successful slander against the cause of the free market in Africa. Lumumba's martyrdom identified socialism with independence, and, for Africans, endowed socialism with a luster that has been slow to fade. For many years, to some extent even today, the most logical actions of the free marketplace must sometimes be rationalized around the political need of African leaders to identify with "socialism" in the Lumumba tradition.

One can only guess what would have become of Lumumba's prime ministership had the U.S.-Soviet cold war, which didn't concern him, not intruded. Perhaps Nkrumah would have persuaded Lumumba to create a one-party socialist state and enroll it in Nkrumah's dreamed-of pan-African empire (built on socialist idealism, but with Nkrumah in charge, of course). Perhaps, like Mobutu, Lumumba would have created a one-party socialist state to achieve an empire of his own. Perhaps Lumumba would have been selfless enough to see that the interests of his people lay in dispersing control of the country's wealth widely among themselves, rather than in centralizing it. Perhaps he would have built a country with economic and political freedom. Perhaps, after a few years, he would have grown disenchanted with his first course, whatever it was, and tried another. Alas, the most likely answer is, none of the above.

Wiser, more calculating African leaders than he were swept off the pages of history within a year or two. Absent the big powers, the odds are that Lumumba's name would have been lost with the others. A couple of truckloads of soldiers could pull off a coup without firing a shot in the new states of black Africa. So remote were the governments from the people that few would even know of such a coup, except that music was interrupted on the radio for an announcement that one leader had been replaced by another, and there were some speeches until the music started again. (And as mentioned, in the Congo, most people didn't even have radios.) Unless one's own tribe were going from subordinacy to preeminence or vice versa, the change in government mattered little.

A personal note may illustrate: in December 1965, the author and some friends, all of us Peace Corps volunteers, were traveling up the West African coast on holiday. In Cotonou, Dahomey (now called the Republic of Benin),

we visited the presidential palace as tourists one morning and noticed two open military trucks in the driveway, each with a single mounted gun and maybe two dozen soldiers in the back. We watched awhile, assuming it was some sort of ceremony. But nothing seemed to be happening, so we walked on to the market, where we browsed and chatted with people for hours.

That evening we rode a taxi to Lomé, the capital of neighboring Togo. After passing routinely through the immigration posts of both countries, we arrived at the Peace Corps hostel in Lomé, and were startled to be welcomed by several obviously relieved embassy and Peace Corps officials. They explained that a coup d'état had occurred in Cotonou that morning, and that they were worried for the safety of Americans who might be trapped there. We had actually watched one of these coups take place and had not even known. In practical terms, nothing had happened. Talking with dozens of Dahomeyans that day, and being in every important public place in the country's main city, we had heard no mention of a coup until we met U.S. officials in a neighboring country.

Appropriately, the Dahomeyan president who had so peacefully lost his job that day was named Apithy.

SINCE 1965, governments throughout Africa and most of the Third World have noticeably increased their effect on daily life. A greater sense of nationhood has developed. But national governments continue to be a much more distant and shapeless factor in the lives of most people in most countries than the U.S. assumes. This remoteness of government would be dictated by poor communications and transportation, and by splintered ethnic loyalties, even if it weren't encouraged by other factors (such as the lack of an economy sophisticated enough to demand big government). The role of Washington in U.S. life is simply not analogous to the role of governments in the lives of people in most countries. Yet the State Department and the U.S. press corps often continue to act as if the mood of Upper Volta, or Indonesia, or wherever can be accurately gleaned from talks with a few government leaders.

Americans unfairly confuse the views and behavior of these leaders with the views and behavior of their people. Thus we discover that the government of Zaire, or Libya, or Panama is run by crooks, or irrational polemicists, and we deductively assign the sins of this leadership clique to the whole country. We want to vent our hostility on the general population. This is especially unfair considering that the leaders who are guilty of these affronts have sometimes been placed in power by U.S. government agents. It is also counterproductive, because hostile U.S. action can create genuine popular animosity toward the U.S., and toward our system, that didn't previously exist. It can rally popular support for the obnoxious leaders that they didn't previously have. If we don't interfere, these leadership cliques tend to come and go.

Occasionally, in the two decades or so of postcolonial African history, shots have been fired to bring down governments. More rarely, there were fair elections (but never, yet, a continuation of fair, multiparty elections from one administration to the next in the same country). Some rulers have died in disgrace, which was imposed on them by their successors, who then suffered the same fate after their own turn in office. Some rulers live out their days in obscurity, often in the former colonial capital in Europe, sometimes sheltered by some friendly potentate elsewhere in Africa. They typically reappear only once, in a two-paragraph obituary in the *New York Times*. This is the context in which Lamumba must be seen.

It is on the whole a pretty sorry record, though not exactly unpredictable, considering that native and colonial monarchies dominated previous African history. The democratic experiment had no example in Africa, and badly needed one. So perhaps the sorriest, and the most unnecessary, blight on the record of this new era, is that the precedent for it all, the very first coup in postcolonial African history, the very first political assassination, and the very first junking of a legally constituted democratic system, all took place in a major country, and *were all instigated by the United States of America*. It's a sad situation when people are left to learn their "democracy" from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

IF the U.S.'s Congo policy worked against the interests of the African people, one might ask if the policy was at least necessary to protect the interests of the U.S. people. The answer may lie in the following: of the few African leaders from the 1960 era who survived long, at least two—Sékou Touré of Guinea and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania—were self-proclaimed socialists. Both decreed a one-party political system, and imposed an order on their people that would be unacceptable to Americans. (For example, Nyerere forced farm families to move out of their traditional villages and onto communes.)

Yet both Touré and Nyerere have maintained relatively good relations with the West. Neither is regarded as an enemy, even by the U.S. faction that rails against supposed Soviet puppet states in Africa. The U.S. courts Nyerere of Tanzania as a mediator in disputes, such as over the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Much the same holds true in Zambia, where the venerable Kenneth Kaunda is completing his second decade of one-man rule, during which he nationalized practically everything in the name of his disease-ridden and ill-fed people. But he's friendly to us. Relations with Guinea were troubled in the early years when Touré was a follower of Nkrumah, but that's changed, and the U.S. and France have been Guinea's leading trade partners of late.

Despite their belief in the socialist ethic, these leaders could read the world's economic cards clearly enough to see that the deal offered by Western commerce was too valuable to pass up. In fact, Nyerere has successfully

soaked the West for all he could. His country is one of the world's leading per capita beneficiaries of Western largess, with some \$3 billion in aid gifts to go with \$1.5 billion in loans for 18 million people.

Those loans are in big trouble. Tanzania isn't making enough money to repay them, and the U.S. taxpayer, through the IMF or some domestic mechanism, may have to pick up much of the bill. But this is only because U.S. bankers were allowed to use the taxpayer as a guarantor for the banks' bad loans in the first place. Some taxpayers might grow to wish we had let the Russians finance the communization of Tanzanian farming (except that that might have driven us to invade the place, which would have cost even more). Other than the bank loans, which were solely the result of our own bad judgment, the U.S. people could scarcely have better relations with Guinea or Tanzania. The unfortunate economic choices of those countries' governments have hurt their people, but not ours (except in the abstract sense that if Guineans and Tanzanians were wealthier, they would make better trade partners). It would surely be nice to see more people enjoy more freedom. But compared to the unfortunate choices made by most other governments on earth, the choices of Guinea's and Tanzania's are not really below average.

THAT Lumumba could have survived in office very long, let alone as long as Touré, Nyrere, or Kaunda, is doubtful. Because of its hugeness, its complex tribal makeup, and the presence of great potential wealth, the Congo might have been more apt to follow the pattern of Nigeria, which has had a long, alternating succession of civilian and military rulers.

For the fact that millions of people remember Lumumba, and respect him, he shares much in common with Bartolomeo Vanzetti, the 1920s Massachusetts anarchist who publicly thanked his executioners for bringing the ideas of "a simple fishmonger" to the world's attention by sending him to the electric chair. Even Mobutu, the U.S.-supported dictator who effectively pulled the switch on Lumumba, felt compelled to build his victim a martyr's statue.

Today, the statue towers over the capital city of Kinshasa like the unpayable foreign debt that helped finance it. The Lumumba memorial and the foreign debt are, respectively, the city's most prominent physical and spiritual landmarks. The American taxpayer hired the killers and then bought the statue, too, like some Mafia boss supplying his victim with a first-rate funeral and sending a carload of flowers to the widow.

And what did the American taxpayer get for it all? He got millions of Africans who regularly encounter the name Lumumba, and who know not only the fact, but the slightly exaggerated and oversimplified version of the fact: Lumumba was a courageous African nationalist and the United States of America killed him.

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IF Lumumba's death was supposed to bring peace and order to the Congo, it certainly did no such thing. Congolese developments after Lumumba's passing had all the logic and neatness (though none of the humor) of a Marx Brothers movie. U.N. troops wound up on a bloody march against Katanga. When U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld flew in for a peace talk, his plane crashed, killing him. His successor was U Thant, of Burma—a once-wealthy, now-poor country not noted for the wisdom of its own management in recent times. Thant publicly expressed the opinion that the Katangese leaders he was negotiating with were “a bunch of clowns.”

Meanwhile, Kasavubu and Mobutu (in other words, the United States) were facing the same problem with Lumumba's lieutenant, Antoine Gizenga, that they had faced with Lumumba: namely, every time they held an election, Gizenga kept winning. In 1962, we tried to reorganize the Congo again under a new constitutional agreement. When parliament elected its own officers, it revealed a heavy pro-Gizenga plurality, if not an actual majority. So when it came time to vote for a new prime minister, Kasavubu undercut Gizenga's forces by announcing that he would nominate a “unity” candidate of his own. Mobutu then declared that if the “unity” candidate wasn't endorsed by parliament, the army would take over again.

Kasavubu's candidate turned out to be Ambassador Timberlake's favorite for the job, too—Cyrille Adoula. Adoula had long been on the CIA payroll, and had been a leader in CIA-supported “trade unions.” These really weren't trade unions at all in the American sense of the term (you would not, for example, have gone to one of their meetings to propose a strike), but were agencies of government control.\* The pro-Gizenga parliamentarians swallowed Adoula anyway, having been warned that if they didn't, they would all have to go back to their villages without their fancy titles and expense accounts.

Stephen Weissman, later of the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff, has reported being told by U.S. officials who had been in the Congo at the time that the CIA and even the U.N. were spreading secret bribe money around parliament during the balloting. He quotes a CIA memorandum saying that “The U.N. and the United States in closely coordinated activities played essential roles in this significant success over Gizenga.” Gizenga himself protested, but to no avail, and finally agreed to take the title of “first vice-premier” (there were second and third vice-premiers to salve other egos as well).

Then the U.S.—which would have bellowed like crazy at much tamer Soviet interference in the affairs of other countries—set about trying to prop its man up. The State Department and CIA, according to the CIA memo-

\*See chapter 20.



randum Weissman obtained, were "endeavoring to help Adoula improve his political base of support and enhance his domestic power and stature. This activity is in the areas of political organization with connected trade union and youth groups, public relations, and security apparatus." A U.S. agent, supposedly a public relations man, was stationed in Adoula's office.

But the voters, to the scarcely adequate extent that they had ever been consulted, had favored Gizenga. And Gizenga was understandably upset with the U.S. because it had been trying to kill him. (Devlin's execution plan in September 1960 was thwarted with minutes to spare only because of the chance intervention of some Moroccan U.N. troops.)

Actually, over the next few years almost everyone *but* Gizenga had a hand at being prime minister of the Congo at one time or another and failed, some more than once. Not only Timberlake's man, Adoula, but Charles Bohlen's man, Ileo, took a turn.

Most remarkable was Moise Tshombe, the secessionist Balunda chieftain who had captured the heart of the conservative movement in the United States, and who then (a) killed Lumumba and hid the body, (b) was arrested by Kasavubu and Mobutu a few months later when he showed up at a peace conference, (c) was charged with murder in the Lumumba case, although his accusers, Kasavubu and Mobutu, had planned the murder, (d) could not immediately be tried, because, as the *New York Times* noted, "the Congo has no high court, no judges, and only one attorney", (e) agreed from prison to end the Katangese secession, (f) was immediately set free by Kasavubu and Mobutu, (g) raced right home and seceded again, (h) fought against Congolese and U.N. troops for about two years using mostly white mercenaries, (i) lost, (j) went into hiding in Europe, (k) was begged by Kasavubu to come back and be prime minister of the whole Congo because nobody else could run the place, (l) did for about a year, (m) was fired and charged with treason by Kasavubu, (n) fled to Spain, (o) was sentenced to death in absentia, (p) wound up in Algeria thanks to an airplane hijacking in 1967, and (q) died there in jail, incommunicado, in 1969, while the Congo (by that time Zaire) was still trying to extradite him so it could hang him.

Meanwhile, Tshombe's Balunda army, those right-wing stooges for reactionary U.S.-Belgian neocolonialism, melted into the bush on both sides of the Angolan border and began changing costumes and makeup for their second act appearance as left-wing Cuban-backed communist guerrillas during the Shaba uprisings of 1977 and 1978.

Throughout this period of revolving prime ministers, Kasavubu and Mobutu stayed constantly close to power, and, one might say, held it. But a decision had been made, at U.S. urging, to maintain the facade of parliamentary democracy. Mobutu couldn't be prime minister because he had never been elected to parliament—or to anything else, for that matter (a condition that holds true even today, unless you count a few uncontested police-state referenda after he seized power).



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MINERAL riches had focused the outside world's attention on the secessions in Katanga and Kasai. But after the U.N. force had ended those secessions, and had packed up and left, other rebellions remained. In 1964, the formal departure of the last U.N. forces was accompanied by a wave of rebel attacks on towns and missionary outposts throughout the Congo. Tshombe, then prime minister, blamed this, naturally enough, on China.

He said China was orchestrating the attacks through its embassy in a tiny but politically volatile country called Burundi, which borders the Congo on the east. In a move suspiciously reminiscent of a standard U.S. intelligence agency ploy, Tshombe produced what he said were some captured military documents, and a Chinese defector who announced that China was attempting to take over the Congo as part of a plot to conquer all of Africa.

Somehow, this determined threat from the world's largest country was beaten back rather easily, as soon as the U.S. fulfilled Tshombe's request for unilateral U.S. military aid: C-130 transport planes, C-47 transport planes, B-26 light bombers, T-48 fighters armed with rockets and machine guns, heavy-duty H-21 helicopters, technicians, mercenary pilots and crewmen, military ground vehicles, arms, ammunition, a contingent of U.S. troops (first only to guard the aircraft, then to protect "rescue" workers on missions), and, finally, help in recruiting and organizing a mercenary army.

The U.S. also agreed that the Belgians would send in up to 400 command officers for the mercenary army, which was composed largely of white South Africans and Rhodesians. The makeup of this army almost guaranteed popular opposition; no one outside black Africa can fully appreciate the depth of the hatred people there feel toward racist South Africa.

All this was a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy, and was accomplished over some congressional objection. Throughout the 1960 crisis, the cornerstone of the U.S. public position had been that all aid to the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations. It was on this ground that the U.S. condemned the Soviet Union for even talking about sending military supplies directly to Lumumba's Congolese government. It was on this ground that Secretary of State Herter and Under Secretary Dillon not only refused Lumumba's requests for aid during his trip to Washington, but fairly ridiculed him for even asking.

Suddenly, on the basis of some "captured documents" and a single defecting Chinese diplomat, the U.S. decided that channeling all aid to the Congo through the United Nations was no longer a fundamental moral principle of international relations. The jettisoning of that principle was to mean a lot to Mobutu in years to come.

ONE center of rebellion in 1964 was Kivu province in the far east of the Congo, bordering on Burundi. Kivu is really more attuned to open,

touristy East Africa, with its large Arab and white populations, than it is to the teeming, jungly West Africa of Kinshasa, with its rich cultural traditions. Kivu is a whole continent apart, and there are no decent roads. Kivu's remoteness offered a sanctuary for old Lumumba troops, and some have held out as rebels even into the 1980s, persistently cutting off tourist access to some of the world's most spectacular mountain-and-lake scenery.

The Kivu rebels gained brief international attention in 1975 when they kidnapped three Stanford University wildlife students and a Dutch companion from a base in Tanzania where the students were observing primate behavior, just across Lake Tanganyika from Kivu. The students were looking for gorillas, and encountered guerrillas instead. After some chest-beating, however, the rebels released three captives, all in good health, and reduced their ransom demands from \$500,000 and guns to \$40,000 and no guns. Stanford arranged payment, under terms it still won't specify, and the remaining student was also released relatively unharmed.\*

A far more serious problem were the remaining rebels in Lumumba's old stronghold of Stanleyville (later Kisangani, the place Mama Singa picked up her truck). The Stanleyville rebels were organized around Lumumba's lieutenant, Antoine Gizenga. Back in 1962, Kasavubu and Mobutu had lured Gizenga to Leopoldville, the capital (later Kinshasa), and talked him into ending his secession long enough for them to appoint a new government in Stanleyville that would be loyal to the Kinshasa regime. But Gizenga felt double-crossed by the way things had gone after that—the announcement by Kasavubu and Mobutu that Adoula had to be voted prime minister or parliament would be dissolved.

Gizenga announced the formation of a new political party with a strong anti-Western attitude, and he particularly accused the U.S. of having replaced the Belgians as colonialists. (It's not hard to figure out how he might have come to that conclusion; on top of everything else, the U.S. had tried and almost succeeded in killing *Gizenga*.)

Around Stanleyville, Gizenga held more respect than the appointed administrator, one of Mobutu's generals. There was fighting. In January 1963, the government charged Gizenga with carrying out secessionist activities, and Mobutu's troops surrounded his house. Gizenga was plucked out by the U.N. and flown to an island in the Congo River where he was held prisoner under U.N. protection.

\*Relatively," in the sense that one is always harmed, in ways difficult to measure, by being held captive and put in fear for one's life. On the other hand, the suffering done by the average citizen in many places where hostages are taken—like Kivu, or Stanleyville, or Tehran—is worse. This is especially true with hindsight, now that we know there's a happy ending for those who get to fly back to a split-level in Palo Alto, but not those who must continue to live in fear and deprivation in Kivu, or Stanleyville, or Tehran. They have all suffered unjustly.

By 1964, his loyalists from the farming areas around Stanleyville—places like Yalifoka—were strong enough to set up a rebel government in Stanleyville itself. But Gizenga, who as a leader was already a cut below Lumumba, was held on his Elba, leaving operations in Stanleyville under the direction of associates who proved totally irresponsible. They started out under the guise of a left-wing “people’s republic,” but they called themselves the Simbas, or lions. No human being could be proud of the way they behaved.

In the fall of 1964, the rebels rounded up several hundred whites, including a renowned American missionary doctor, Paul E. Carlson, and held them hostage. They hoped the hostage-taking would forestall attacks by the U.S.-supplied mercenary army that had just begun a drive to end the rebellion. They also sought world recognition.

It is doubtful the rebels wanted or expected a violent resolution to a crisis they probably underestimated. They kept the hostages in the best hotel in Stanleyville. U.S. consular personnel were beaten, though apparently not seriously injured. There was emotional abuse. Two U.S. envoys had to chew on a U.S. flag. A mock trial was staged in front of screaming throngs who threatened to kill and eat the whites. Dr. Carlson’s execution as a spy was threatened and postponed, threatened and postponed. But, at bottom, it was mainly talk until a U.S.-European military force was dispatched.

Assertedly, this force was on a humanitarian mission to rescue the hostages. But it was obviously timed to coincide with the arrival of the U.S.-supplied white mercenary army on the fringes of Stanleyville. Had the army entered the city without a plan to rescue the hostages first, the hostages might indeed have faced a massacre. Of course, if the U.S. hadn’t formed and supplied the white mercenary army, the hostages probably never would have been taken. And if Lumumba hadn’t been dumped from office and killed, the Simbas might never have rebelled.

For the rescue mission, the U.S. flew in 600 Belgian paratroopers. Even in its best light, the operation had a dual purpose. The Belgians intended all along that after shipping out the hostages who survived, they would stay on in Stanleyville for a week or so “mopping up.” The *New York Times* reported in its multiple-story coverage atop page one, “The Western planners of the rescue exercise concluded that with the collapse of the rebels’ Stanleyville ‘government,’ resistance elsewhere would probably crumble.” The “rescuers” had come to conquer.

The rebels gathered all the whites in the area, more than 800 of them, and warned that they would be killed if the U.S.-Belgian force arrived. It arrived. On the day the crisis broke, shooting started as the white soldiers proceeded to town from the airport. The hostages were grouped together in front of the hotel. As the military mission approached, some of the hostages were shot by their captors, others started to flee, and the shooting became general. According to official figures, thirty white hostages were killed. Two

were Americans, both missionaries; one was Dr. Carlson, who was shot while trying to escape over a brick wall. Thirty-seven other Americans were flown out safely, as were the great majority of white hostages. Fifty rebels died in the combat, none of the paratroopers, and one mercenary in the arriving "Congolese" army.

Many Third World countries protested at the U.N. what they contended was big-power intervention in a Third World civil war. Some revived speculation that the U.S. had planned Lumumba's murder. One U.N. ambassador said the Stanleyville raid had proved to him that a "white, if his name is Carlson, or if he is an American, a Belgian, or an Englishman, is worth thousands upon thousands of blacks."

The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, responded with righteous indignation. "I have served in the United Nations from the day of inception off and on for seven years," he said. "But never before have I heard such irrational, irresponsible, insulting, and repugnant language in these chambers; and language used, if you please, to contemptuously impugn and slander a gallant and successful effort to save human lives of many nationalities and colors.

"The United States took part in no operation with military purposes in the Congo," Ambassador Stevenson told the General Assembly in his big speech. "From the beginning, we have been opposed—and remain opposed—to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign and independent State of the Congo."

Then Stevenson said, "Let us not be hypocritical. Either each government recognizes the right of other governments to exist and refrain from attempting to overthrow them, or we shall revert to a primitive state of anarchy in which each conspires against its neighbor. The golden rule is, do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

One thinks of how they must have smiled—Larry Devlin, Dr. Gottlieb, WI/ROGUE, QJ/WIN, Allen Dulles, Mobutu Sese Seko—when they picked up their newspapers and read Stevenson's lecture to other countries: "Let us not be hypocritical." As for Eisenhower, perhaps he wouldn't have understood the humor in it anymore than Stevenson did.

With all that Stevenson said, though, there was something he didn't say, which maybe people had a right to know. Before becoming U.N. ambassador, after leaving the Illinois governorship in 1952, during the eight years in which he sought the presidency three times, Stevenson practiced law. And one of his larger clients was—Maurice Tempelman.

Stevenson, a two-time Democratic presidential nominee, had toured Africa with Tempelman in the late 1950s, meeting those Africans Tempelman sought to woo.

Stevenson's U.N. speech was widely praised in the United States. The American people had not been advised by their government that the Congolese leaders who invited the Western intervention had been installed by a U.S.-

instigated coup. The people were not told that those leaders were unlocking a fortune for Stevenson's big law client. In a typical editorial, the *Wall Street Journal* compared Stevenson's remarks to the hallowed words of the country's first cold war secretary of state, Dean Acheson. The *Journal* said the West should stop "seeking moral justification [for its acts] in the proclamations of others," and start "looking for it in its own conscience. In its conscience the ultimate question must be not about tactics, but whether the policy is truly designed, as Secretary Acheson said, 'to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish.' When the answer is yes, the West need not be ashamed of its policies, in the Congo or elsewhere."

THE U.S.-European military force secured Stanleyville and several other cities in the area. Then it pulled out, and the rebels poured back in from the bush. The real massacre began. For five years, the Simbas terrorized the whole northeast quadrant of the Congo. It would be impossible to estimate the number of people they killed. But you cannot find a family in the area that wasn't touched by their murderous gangs or forced to hide in the bush to avoid them. There was anarchy.

In a mad campaign to insure that traitors would never again allow rule by outsiders, the Simbas practiced prophylactic homicide against all educated people, anyone from the bureaucracy, anyone who appeared touched by foreign influence. Since there weren't any *truly* educated people, completion of primary school was the standard qualification for execution. Thousands of men, women, and children were chucked off a bridge that crosses a rocky, swift-flowing branch of the Congo River. Some were stuffed into burlap bags before chucking, others not. The river ran red for years.

On November 25, 1965, Mobutu kicked out Kasavubu and expunged any semblance of democratic government. He was then thirty-five years old. He stated, "The Congo's misery is rooted in a lack of discipline. The new government is going to change that and impose everywhere the spirit of discipline." No records have been released of what the CIA was doing at the time, but it is scarcely conceivable that Mobutu's seizure of power was a surprise to the U.S. or contrary to its desires.

Weissman, the congressional investigator, says he's obtained firsthand accounts of CIA involvement in this coup-to-end-all-coups. William Bader, recent staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a former staffer on the intelligence committee, recalls testimony by a CIA officer that Mobutu once "whipped out a revolver and flung it on the desk" in front of the officer, saying that if the CIA didn't start supplying more financial support, the officer might as well "just shoot me on the spot."

Officially, by 1966, the Simba rebellion was over and Mobutu ran the Congo. Visas were issued for foreigners to travel to Stanleyville. But such

travel was impossible, because the Simba violence in fact continued.\* By 1970, the insurrection was indeed crushed, and visitors could at last travel through the area. It was a disaster. Whole towns were deserted. Life had returned to Stanleyville—foreigners said they had begun to come back in 1969—but government throughout the region was in the hands of appointed military officers, who ruled by discretion.

WHAT was going on in that secreted, closed-off quadrant of the Congo in the mid-1960s was perhaps the craziest episode of all, and perhaps the most bizarre civil war in history—not between Congolese and other Congolese, but between Cubans and other Cubans.

The U.S. and Belgium had infused the Congolese struggle from the beginning with mercenaries, many of whom were recruited through clandestine government channels, including the CIA. The CIA had long been looking for ways to employ the army of Cubans it had assembled for the unsuccessful 1961 invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. According to Church Committee evidence, the CIA began to bring anti-Castro Cuban pilots to the Congo early in 1964, to bomb railroads, bridges, and other targets in areas under rebel control or threatened by it. As the year wound on and the U.S. began to support a mercenary army for the Congo openly as well as covertly, more Cubans were brought in. According to Weissman,<sup>†</sup> a CIA force of Cubans was standing by near Stanleyville the day of the paratroop drop in case it failed.

Meanwhile, hearing Gizenga's call, Castro dispatched several hundred of *his* Cuban troops, under the personal command of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Castro's closest friend and assistant. There is no sure public proof of which Cubans arrived in the Congo first, but the dates in evidence suggest ours did, and that Castro was impelled toward the fray by learning (as he inevitably would have) that the CIA's Cubans were already fighting on the other side. It's clear, though, that Guevara and his men also went to the Congo out of a genuine desire to help establish Gizenga's "people's republic"—to further the Simba rebellion. And when they did, the CIA responded with even greater numbers of its own Cubans.

So there, in the remotest corner of central Africa, 8,000 miles from the small Caribbean island where it started, the Cuban civil war resumed. At one point, according to veteran foreign service officers, U.S. taxpayers even launched a Cuban-manned navy, composed of several ships, on Lake Tanganyika, to clear the waters of Lumumba/Gizenga allies in Kivu province, and to stop any arms that Guevara's real Cubans might be bringing in from Burundi or elsewhere by water. Whether Cubans actually engaged in naval

\*I was issued a visa, but was stranded in the jungle hundreds of miles from Stanleyville, on the fringes of an area no truck driver would agree to enter in 1967.

<sup>†</sup>Who published an account in *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1979.

combat with each other on Lake Tanganyika is unrecorded, but the mere possibility boggles the mind.

Castro finally pulled Guevara out, apparently in 1967. Little if anything was ever made public about the episode. In September 1981, a reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* (the author) suddenly raised the subject with Castro at a cocktail reception in Havana. Castro seemed shocked, took a step backward, and finally said, "Nothing has ever been published about that." The reporter pressed for an answer to the question of why Guevara left. Castro thought a moment, and said, "He went to help them with a revolution. He spent a short time there, and he succeeded, and he left."

The reporter asked how, with a ruthless, U.S.-allied dictator still in command, Guevara could have thought his mission had been accomplished. Castro paused again (noticeable because he responded to every other line of questioning with aplomb), and said, "He did not go there to conduct a revolution for them. He helped them. He did what he could, and Cuba needed him to come back."

The next year, the reporter filed Freedom of Information Act requests for CIA and State Department accounts of the episode. As this book goes to press, the requests are reported still being processed. Pending new information, however, one can make a pretty good guess why Guevara went home (or rather, unfortunately for him, to Bolivia, where the CIA finally caught up with him):

Castro had made the same mistake that his enemies in Washington had been making in the Congo since 1960—thinking that leftists were leftists, revolutions were revolutions, and that people in places like the Congo really cared about a global struggle between Left and Right, East and West, capitalism and communism.

Guevara and his men slipped into the Congo expecting to find a heroic, impassioned people fighting for the dignity and liberty of mankind—or at least some folks who could be dressed up and passed off that way. What he found instead was a barbaric rabble of starving farmers-turned-cutthroats, incapable of immediately being organized into anything that he or very many other people would want to be associated with. How many innocent souls Guevara helped them kill is something we probably can't know. His mistake, though, was eventually tempered in one way that Washington's was not: he left.

Trying to make sense of what seems almost definitional madness, there is one great overriding question behind these foreign intrusions. That is, to what extent would the mere survival of Lumumba, either in power or to his point of natural removal from it, have placated his followers and forestalled bloodshed. If the illusion of democratic order, civility, and law—which is what Lumumba represented when he took office—could have been maintained longer, would it have become the *reality* of democratic order, civility, and law? In the Congo, we forfeited our chance to ever find out.